

# CS 277: Control and Reinforcement Learning

Winter 2021

## Lecture 14: Inverse RL

**Roy Fox**

Department of Computer Science

Bren School of Information and Computer Sciences

University of California, Irvine



# Today's lecture

---

Feature Matching

MaxEnt IRL

GAIL

# Learning rewards from demonstrations

- RL: rewards  $\rightarrow$  policy; IL: demonstrations  $\rightarrow$  policy
- Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL): demonstrations  $\rightarrow$  reward function
  - Better understand agents (humans, animals, users, markets)
    - Preference elicitation, teleology (the “what for” of actions), theory of mind, language
  - First step toward Apprenticeship Learning: demos  $\rightarrow$  rewards  $\rightarrow$  policy
    - Infer the teacher's goals and learn to achieve them; overcome suboptimal demos
    - Partly model-based (learn  $r$  but not  $p$ ); may be easier to learn, generalize, transfer
    - Teacher and learner can have different action spaces (e.g., human  $\rightarrow$  robot)

# Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL)

- Given a dataset of **demonstration trajectories**  $\mathcal{D} = \{\xi_i\}$
- Find teacher's **reward function**  $r : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ 
  - ▶ **Principle**: demonstrated actions should achieve high expected return
- IRL is **ill-defined**
  - ▶ How low is the reward for states and actions **not in**  $\mathcal{D}$ ?
  - ▶ How is the reward **distributed** along the trajectory?
    - Sparse rewards = identify “**subgoal**” states; dense = score **each step**, as hard as IL
  - ▶ Demonstrator can be **fallible** = take suboptimal actions; how much?

# Feature matching

- Assume linear reward  $r_\theta(s) = \theta^\top f_s$  in oracle state features  $f_s \in \mathbb{R}^d$ 
  - ▶  $\implies$  Return =  $R_{\pi;\theta} = \sum_t \gamma^t \mathbb{E}_{s_t \sim p_\pi} [\theta^\top f_{s_t}] = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_\pi} [\theta^\top f_s]$  (with  $p_\theta(s) = \sum_t \gamma^t p_\theta(s_t)$ )
    - $t \sim \text{Geom}(1 - \gamma)$   
up to  $\cdot (1 - \gamma)$
- Teacher optimality: return  $R_{e;\theta}$  higher than any other policy's return  $R_{\pi;\theta}$ 
  - ▶  $\implies$  Find  $\theta$  that maximizes the gap  $R_{e;\theta} - R_{\pi;\theta}$  (for which  $\pi$ ?)
  - ▶  $\implies$  Apprenticeship Learning: find  $\pi$  that maximizes  $R_{\pi;\theta}$  (for which  $\theta$ ?)
- Solve:  $\max_{\theta} \min_{\pi} \{R_{e;\theta} - R_{\pi;\theta}\} = \max_{\theta} \min_{\pi} \{ \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_e} [\theta^\top f_s] - \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_\pi} [\theta^\top f_s] \}$ 
  - ▶ Approximate  $s \sim p_e$  with  $s \sim \mathcal{D}$

# Feature matching

- Feature Matching:

- ▶ Initialize  $\Pi = \{\pi_0\}$

- ▶ Repeat:

- Solve the Quadratic Program:  $\max_{\eta, \|\theta\|_2 \leq 1} \eta$  s.t.  $\mathbb{E}_{s \sim \mathcal{D}}[\theta^\top f_s] \geq \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_\pi}[\theta^\top f_s] + \eta \quad \forall \pi \in \Pi$

- Add to  $\Pi$  the optimal policy  $\pi$  for  $r_\theta(s) = \theta^\top f_s$

- On convergence:  $\pi$  optimal for  $\theta$  (no gap), can't find  $\theta$  with gap

- ▶  $\implies \mathbb{E}_{s \sim \mathcal{D}}[\theta^\top f_s] \approx \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_\pi}[\theta^\top f_s]$  for all  $\theta \implies \mathbb{E}_{s \sim \mathcal{D}}[f_s] \approx \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_\pi}[f_s]$

feature matching

# Today's lecture


---

Feature Matching

**MaxEnt IRL**

GAIL

# Modeling bounded teachers

- An **expert** teacher maximizes the return  $R_{e;\theta} = \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \mathbb{E}_{s_t \sim p_e} [\theta^\top f_{s_t}] = \mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim p_e} [\theta^\top f_\xi]$ 
  - ▶ With the trajectory-summed features  $f_\xi = \sum_t f_{s_t}$
- **Bounded rationality**: teacher has “unintentional” prior policy  $\pi_0$ 
  - ▶ Cost to intentionally **diverge**:  $\mathbb{D}[\pi_e \parallel \pi_0]$  (with  $\pi_0$  uniform:  $\mathbb{H}[\pi_e]$ )
  - ▶ Total cost over trajectory:  $\mathbb{D}[p_e(\xi) \parallel p_0(\xi)] = \mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim p_e} \left[ \log \frac{p_e(\xi)}{p_0(\xi)} \right] = \sum_t \mathbb{E}_{s_t \sim p_e} \left[ \log \frac{\pi_e(a_t | s_t)}{\pi_0(a_t | s_t)} \right]$ 
- **Bounded optimality**:  $\max_{\pi_e} \mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim p_e} [\theta^\top f_\xi] - \tau \mathbb{D}[p_e \parallel p_0]$



# Bounded optimality: naïve solution

- Bounded optimality:  $\max_{\mathcal{P}_e} \mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim p_e} [\theta^\top f_\xi] - \mathbb{D}[p_e || p_0]$ 
  - ▶ Naïve solution: allow **any** distribution  $p_e$  over trajectories
  - ▶ No need to be consistent with **dynamics**  $p(s' | s, a) \implies p_e$  may be **unachievable**

- Add the **constraint**  $\sum_{\xi} p_e(\xi) = 1$  with Lagrange multiplier  $\lambda$

- **Differentiate** by  $p_e(\xi)$  and  $= 0$  to optimize

$$\theta^\top f_\xi - \log p_e(\xi) + \log p_0(\xi) - 1 + \lambda = 0 \implies p_e(\xi) = \frac{p_0(\xi) \exp(\theta^\top f_\xi)}{\sum_{\bar{\xi}} p_0(\bar{\xi}) \exp(\theta^\top f_{\bar{\xi}})}$$

# IRL with bounded teacher

- Assume that demonstrations are distributed  $p_{\theta}(\xi) = \frac{1}{Z_{\theta}} p_0(\xi) \exp(\theta^{\top} f_{\xi})$ 
  - ▶ With partition function  $Z_{\theta} = \mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim p_0} [\exp(\theta^{\top} f_{\xi})]$
- Find  $\theta$  that minimizes NLL of demonstrations

$$\begin{aligned}\nabla_{\theta} \log p_{\theta}(\xi) &= \nabla_{\theta} (\theta^{\top} f_{\xi} - \log Z_{\theta}) = f_{\xi} - \frac{1}{Z_{\theta}} \nabla_{\theta} Z_{\theta} \\ &= f_{\xi} - \frac{1}{Z_{\theta}} \mathbb{E}_{\bar{\xi} \sim p_0} [\exp(\theta^{\top} f_{\bar{\xi}}) f_{\bar{\xi}}] = f_{\xi} - \mathbb{E}_{\bar{\xi} \sim p_{\theta}} [f_{\bar{\xi}}]\end{aligned}$$

- ▶ To compute gradient, we need  $p_{\theta} \implies$  we need  $Z_{\theta}$

# Computing $Z_\theta$ : backward recursion

- Partition function:  $Z_\theta = \mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim p_0} [\exp(\theta^\top f_\xi)]$

- Compute  $Z_\theta$  recursively **backward**:

$$Z_\theta(s_t, a_t) = \mathbb{E}_{p_0} [\exp(\theta^\top f_{\xi \geq t}) \mid s_t, a_t]$$

$$Z_\theta(s_t) = \mathbb{E}_{p_0} [\exp(\theta^\top f_{\xi \geq t}) \mid s_t]$$

- $Z_\theta$  defines  $p_\theta(\xi) = \frac{1}{Z_\theta} p_0(\xi) \exp(\theta^\top f_\xi)$

- ▶ **Marginalizing**:  $\pi_\theta(a_t \mid s_t) = \pi_0(a_t \mid s_t) \frac{Z_\theta(s_t, a_t)}{Z_\theta(s_t)}$

- $\pi_\theta$  is not globally **consistent**  $p_\theta(\xi) \neq p_{\pi_\theta}(\xi)$ , because we ignored the **dynamics**

# Computing $Z_\theta$ : backward recursion

- Partition function:  $Z_\theta = \mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim p_0}[\exp(\theta^\top f_\xi)]$

- Compute  $Z_\theta$  recursively **backward**:

$$Z_\theta(s_t, a_t) = \mathbb{E}_{p_0}[\exp(\theta^\top f_{\xi \geq t}) \mid s_t, a_t] = \exp(\theta^\top f_{s_t}) \mathbb{E}_{s_{t+1} \mid s_t, a_t \sim p}[Z_\theta(s_{t+1})]$$

$$Z_\theta(s_t) = \mathbb{E}_{p_0}[\exp(\theta^\top f_{\xi \geq t}) \mid s_t] = \mathbb{E}_{a_t \mid s_t \sim \pi_0}[Z_\theta(s_t, a_t)]$$

- $Z_\theta$  defines  $p_\theta(\xi) = \frac{1}{Z_\theta} p_0(\xi) \exp(\theta^\top f_\xi)$

- ▶ **Marginalizing**:  $\pi_\theta(a_t \mid s_t) = \pi_0(a_t \mid s_t) \frac{Z_\theta(s_t, a_t)}{Z_\theta(s_t)}$

- $\pi_\theta$  is not globally **consistent**  $p_\theta(\xi) \neq p_{\pi_\theta}(\xi)$ , because we ignored the **dynamics**

# MaxEnt IRL

- For each sample  $\xi \sim \mathcal{D}$ :

## Limitations:

- ▶ Compute  $Z_\theta = \mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim p_0} [\exp(\theta^\top f_\xi)]$  recursively **backward**
  - ▶ Compute  $\mathbb{E}_{\bar{\xi} \sim p_{\pi_\theta}} [f_{\bar{\xi}}]$  recursively **forward**
  - ▶ Take a gradient step to **improve**  $\theta$ :  $\nabla_\theta \log p_\theta(\xi) \approx f_\xi - \mathbb{E}_{\bar{\xi} \sim p_{\pi_\theta}} [f_{\bar{\xi}}]$
- Requires dynamics  $p$
  - Assumes  $p_\theta = p_{\pi_\theta}$
  - Assumes  $\mathcal{D} = p_e$

- At the optimum: **feature matching**  $\mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim \mathcal{D}} [f_\xi] = \mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim p_{\pi_\theta}} [f_\xi]$

- ▶ **MaxEnt IRL** approximates  $\max_{\theta} \mathbb{H}[\pi_\theta] \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim \mathcal{D}} [f_\xi] = \mathbb{E}_{\xi \sim p_{\pi_\theta}} [f_\xi]$

# Today's lecture

---

Feature Matching


MaxEnt IRL

**GAIL**

# IRL: downstream tasks

- **Motivation:** learn reward function for downstream tasks...

...such as RL



- $IL = RL \circ IRL$  (composition of RL on IRL)
- Our algorithms already learn  $\pi$  as part of learning  $\theta$  for  $r : s \mapsto \theta^\top f_s$ 
  - Let's directly optimize IRL for the overall IL task = learn good  $\pi$

# IL as RL $\circ$ IRL

- Entropy-regularized RL:  $\max_{\pi \in \Pi} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_\pi} [r(s)] + \mathbb{H}[\pi] \right\}$
- MaxEnt IRL:  $\max_{r \in \mathbb{R}^\mathcal{S}} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_e} [r(s)] - \max_{\pi \in \Pi} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_\pi} [r(s)] + \mathbb{H}[\pi] \right\} \right\} - \psi(r)$

regularization over  
reward function space



- For any  $\pi$ , our objective with respect to  $r$  is:

$$\psi^*(p_e - p_\pi) = \max_{r \in \mathbb{R}^\mathcal{S}} \left\{ \overbrace{(p_e - p_\pi) \cdot r}^{\in \mathbb{R}^\mathcal{S}} - \psi(r) \right\}$$

- ▶ This form of function  $\psi^* : \mathbb{R}^\mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is called the convex conjugate of  $\psi$



# Reward-function regularizers

$$\psi^*(p_e - p_\pi) = \max_{r \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{S}}} \{ (p_e - p_\pi) \cdot r - \psi(r) \}$$

- **Without regularizer:**  $\psi = 0 \implies$  solution only exists when  $p_e = p_\pi$ 
  - $\implies$  learner achieves teacher's **state distribution**: perfect solution, but hard to find
- **Hard linearity constraint:**  $\psi(r) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } r(s) = \theta^\top f_s \\ \infty & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$ 
  - $\implies$  max-entropy feature matching (**MaxEnt IRL**)
  - Great when the reward function really is **linear in  $f_s$** , otherwise no guarantees

# Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)

- Train **generative model**  $p_{\theta}(s)$  to generate states / observations

- ▶ Can we focus the training on **failure modes**?

- Also train **discriminator**  $D_{\phi}(s) \in [0,1]$  to score instances

- ▶ Kind of like a critic: are generated instances good?



- $D_{\phi}(s)$  **predicts** the probability  $p(s \text{ generated by learner} | s) = \frac{p_{\theta}(s)}{p_{\theta}(s) + p_e(s)}$


- ▶ Trained with cross-entropy loss:  $\max_{\phi} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_{\theta}} [\log D_{\phi}(s)] + \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_e} [\log(1 - D_{\phi}(s))] \right\}$

- The generator tries to **fool** the discriminator:  $\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_{\theta}} [\log D_{\phi}(s)]$

# Teacher-based reward-function regularizer

- Consider the regularizer

$$\psi_{\text{GA}}(r) = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_e} [r(s) - \underbrace{\log(1 - \exp(-r(s)))}_{D(s)}]$$



- It's convex conjugate is:

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_{\text{GA}}^*(p_e - p_\pi) &= \max_{r \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{S}}} \left\{ (p_e - p_\pi) \cdot r - \psi(r) \right\} \\ &= \max_{r \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{S}}} [r(s) - r(s) + \log(1 - D(s))] - \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_\pi} [\overbrace{r(s)}^{-\log D(s)}] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_\pi} [\log D(s)] + \mathbb{E}_{s \sim p_e} [\log(1 - D(s))] \end{aligned}$$

- ⇒ GAN: generator  $p_\pi$  imitating teacher  $p_e$ ; discriminator  $D(s) = \exp(-r(s))$

# Generative Adversarial Imitation Learning (GAIL)

**Input:** demonstration dataset  $\mathcal{D}_T \sim p_T$

**repeat**

$\mathcal{D}_L \leftarrow$  roll out  $\pi_\theta$

take discriminator gradient ascent step

$$\mathbb{E}_{s \sim \mathcal{D}_L} [\nabla_\phi \log D_\phi(s)] + \mathbb{E}_{s \sim \mathcal{D}_T} [\nabla_\phi \log(1 - D_\phi(s))]$$

take entropy-regularized policy gradient step with reward  $r(s) = -\log D_\phi(s)$

- We've already seen one entropy-regularized PG algorithm: **TRPO**
  - More next time

# Recap

---

- To understand behavior: **infer the intentions** of observed agents
- If teacher is **optimal** for a reward function
  - The reward function should make an optimizer **imitate** the teacher
  - State (or state–action) **distribution** of learner should **match** the teacher
- In this view, **Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL)** is a game:
  - Reward is optimized to show how much the **teacher is better** than the learner
  - **Learner optimizes** for the reward
  - Reward is like a **discriminator** (high = probably teacher); learner like a **generator**